• Employers
    • Permanent Visas
      • PERM Labor Certifications
    • Temporary Visas
      • E-3 Visas
      • H-1B Employment
        • H-1B1 Visa
      • L-1 Visas
      • J-1 Visas
      • O-1 Visas
      • TN, Canadian/Mexican
  • Employees
    • Nonimmigrant Visa Applications (Consular)
    • National Interest Waivers
  • Entrepreneurs
    • E-1 & E-2 Visas
  • Compliance
    • I-9/Worksite Enforcement
  • Family & Individuals
    • Marriage
    • Deportation, Removal & Asylum
    • Hearings & Appeals
    • Naturalization
    • Students
      • STEM OPT Visas
  • About Us
    • Blog
    • Testimonials
    • Attorneys
      • Philip M. Levin, Founder
      • Don L. Pangilinan, Principal
      • Alec P. Wilczynski, Of Counsel
      • Alexandra Cotroneo, Associate

Levin and Pangilinan PC

U.S. Immigration and Nationality Law

¿Necesitas el sitio web en español?

800.974.2691
Contact Us
  • Employers
    • Permanent Visas
      • PERM Labor Certifications
    • Temporary Visas
      • E-3 Visas
      • H-1B Employment
        • H-1B1 Visa
      • L-1 Visas
      • J-1 Visas
      • O-1 Visas
      • TN, Canadian/Mexican
  • Employees
    • Nonimmigrant Visa Applications (Consular)
    • National Interest Waivers
  • Entrepreneurs
    • E-1 & E-2 Visas
  • Compliance
    • I-9/Worksite Enforcement
  • Family & Individuals
    • Marriage
    • Deportation, Removal & Asylum
    • Hearings & Appeals
    • Naturalization
    • Students
      • STEM OPT Visas
  • About Us
    • Blog
    • Testimonials
    • Attorneys
      • Philip M. Levin, Founder
      • Don L. Pangilinan, Principal
      • Alec P. Wilczynski, Of Counsel
      • Alexandra Cotroneo, Associate

BIA Holds That The Offense Of Sponsoring Or Exhibiting An Animal In An Animal Fighting Venture Is A Categorical Crime Invoking Moral Turpitude

September 5, 2018 Philip Levin

BIA Holds That The Offense Of Sponsoring Or Exhibiting An Animal In An Animal Fighting Venture, In Violation of 7 U.S.C § 2156(a)(1), Is A Categorical Crime Invoking Moral Turpitude. An Applicant Who Has Been So Convicted Is Ineligible For Cancellation of Removal Per INA § 240A(b)(1)(C) For Having “Been Convicted Of An Offense Under” INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i), Irrespective Of Both the General “Admission” Requirement in § 237(a) And The Temporal (Within 5 Years Of Admission) Requirement In § 237(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Matter of Ortega-Lopez, 26 I&N Dec. 99 (BIA 2013) and Matter of Cortez, 25 I&N Dec. 301 (BIA 2010), Reaffirmed.

On August 6, 2018, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board) issued a second precedent decision in this matter, having previously dismissed respondent’s appeal in Matter of Ortega-Lopez, 26 I&N Dec. 99 (BIA 2013), holding that his conviction for sponsoring or exhibiting an animal in an animal fighting venture per 7 U.S.C § 2156(a)(1) is a categorical crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT), which qualifies as an “offense under” INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i), rendering him ineligible for cancellation of removal under INA § 240A(b)(1)(C). The case had gone up to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which remanded it to the BIA for further consideration of whether § 2156(a)(1) qualifies as a CIMT in light of its statement in Nunez v. Holder, 594 F. 3d 1124, 1131 (9th Cir. 2010) that “non-fraudulent crimes of moral turpitude almost always involve an intent to harm someone, the actual infliction of harm upon someone, or an action that affects a protected class of victim.” (The circuit court had noted that the language of § 2156(a)(1) pertaining to “harm to chickens” appeared, at first blush, “outside the normal realm” of a CIMT.) The Board thus used the instant opinion to clarify its rationale for concluding that moral turpitude “necessarily inheres in all violations of this statute.”

In its initial analysis regarding whether a conviction is a CIMT, the decision stated that the BIA employs the “categorical approach,” comparing the elements of an offense to those of the generic definition to determine if there is a categorical match. As a predicate to this determination, the opinion had already stated in a footnote that while respondent’s conviction is not for an “offense under” § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) because it qualifies for § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II)’s petty offense exception, he is still ineligible for cancellation as one convicted of an “offense under” § 237(a)(2)(A)(i), per Matter of Cortez, 25 I&N Dec. 301 (BIA 2010). Citing prior precedent, the Board reiterated that to constitute a CIMT, an offense must have two essential elements: 1) a culpable mental state and 2) reprehensible conduct. The decision then explained that the Ninth Circuit defers to the manner in which the BIA applies this definition, through case-by-case adjudication, to assess the “character, gravity, and moral significance” of the conduct in question; however, noted the opinion, such deference “has not been universal” as the Ninth Circuit employs its own definition as well, holding that CIMTs fall into two categories: 1) those involving fraud and 2) those involving grave acts of baseness or depravity. Further, the Ninth Circuit has found that offenses that do not involve fraud but fall into the second category almost always involve “an intent to injure, an injury to person, or an act affecting a protected class of victims.” The instant remand, found the Board, was to consider whether this conviction, which does not involve fraud, involves one of these three circumstances.

In a densely-reasoned explication of this issue, the decision then stated that while “these principles may serve as useful guideposts,” it has never limited the determination of whether an offense is a CIMT to these categories because the definition of moral turpitude is broader; in fact, the Ninth Circuit has found some non-fraud offenses to be CIMTs, even in the absence of one of the three above-enumerated circumstances. And, found the Board, if its understanding in this regard is incorrect, it respectfully disagrees with the federal court’s approach. For example, prostitution and incest are acts “so contrary to the standards of a civilized society as to be morally reprehensible.” Such behavior, held the BIA, is morally repugnant even if relating to “sexual acts committed by consenting adults.” The opinion found the instant offense “to be of a similar nature.” Thus, concluded the Board, in assessing whether an offense that does not include fraud can be a CIMT, the absence of one of the three circumstances is not determinative and reaffirmed its original holding that the crime involves moral turpitude because the conduct involved celebrates animal suffering for human enjoyment, thereby transgressing “the socially accepted rules of morality” and breaching a duty owed society.

Next, in responding to certain concerns of the respondent and amicus, the decision stated that the BIA was not persuaded that one could be convicted under § 2156(a)(1) merely by paying a fee to attend an animal fight or being a vendor at such an event – direct and indirect financial contributions do not fall under the statute. Therefore, concluded the Board, the offense is categorically a CIMT.

Turning to its analysis of the “offense under” § 237(a)(2) language of the INA, the opinion noted that cancellation of removal applicants must prove they have not been convicted of an offense under §§ 212(a)(2), 237(a)(2), or 237 (a)(3) so that the issue here is whether the reference to an “offense under” one of these sections incorporates all or part of those sections or if Congress intended some other interpretation. (Per the Board, the Ninth Circuit had found the statutory text “ambiguous on this point.”) The decision first noted that the removal grounds of INA §§ 237(a)(2) and (3) are generally not applicable to those who entered the U.S. without inspection and have not subsequently been subjected to an act that would constitute an “admission”; they only apply to those “admitted to the United States.” Thus, the question at bar becomes, per the BIA, what aspects of § 237(a)(2) are retained by virtue of the “offense under” language found in § 240A(b)(1)(C).

In explaining its reasoning, the Board expressly disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s statement that it is plausible to read § 240A(b)(1)(C) as incorporating all of § 237(a)(2)(A)(i) but modifying the “within five years” provision as counting from an applicant’s “entry” instead of “admission,” giving two reasons: 1) one of the overriding purposes of the IIRIRA, the 1996 revision to the INA, was to replace the term “entry” with “admission” so that a person who entered without inspection would be subject to the grounds of inadmissibility, not deportability and Congress intended the two terms to have different meanings and 2) interpreting the cross-reference to an “offense under” 237(a)(2) as modifying the meaning of “admission” throughout that subsection is, in the view of the panel, “outside the scope of any ambiguity that exists in” 240A(b)(1)(C).

The BIA found that the “most reasonable reading” of § 240A(b)(1)(C) is that it cross-references “a selected segment-the ‘offense’-of a collective whole,” e.g., the corresponding removability ground of § 237(a)(2) or (3); in this manner, concluded the decision, the meaning of the two sections “remains constant,” with only the “offense” characteristics in each being operative. Later in the opinion, raising a similar interpretory argument, the Board found it unreasonable to infer that Congress intended to require that a cancellation applicant be “deportable” for purposes of relief, yet not “deportable” in the sense “that the term is normally understood.” In sum, held the BIA, the “language and context” of 240A(b)(1)(C) in its entirety compels the conclusion that the “offense under” language is “a limited cross-reference” that incorporates “only the offense-specific characteristics of the cross-referenced sections.”

As such, Matter of Cortez, which held that the plain language of § 240A(b)(1)(C) provides that only the offense-specific characteristics contained in the cross-referenced sections of the INA are applicable in determining whether one has been convicted of an “offense under” one of those sections, was reaffirmed and the Board continued to conclude that neither the “in and admitted” requirement of § 237(a) nor the temporal “admission” requirements “of the specific deportability grounds” are applicable in determining if § 240A(b)(1)(C) disqualifies an applicant from cancellation relief by virtue of an “offense under” 237(a)(2) or (3). The BIA reaffirmed its prior decision denying respondent cancellation, finding his conviction to be for a CIMT which carried a potential sentence of imprisonment for 1 year and dismissed the appeal. Matter of Ortega-Lopez, 27 I&N Dec. 382 (BIA 2018).

Learn more about the immigration services provided by Philip Levin & Associates.

You have questions. We have answers.

Filed Under: Crimes, Felony Case

Contact Us

Recent Blog Posts

  • U.S. Visa Interview Waiver Program: Important 2025 Updates
  • New DOS Guidance on Mandating Social Media Review of all F-1, M-1, and J-1 visa applicants and Possible Revocations: What You Need to Know
  • H-1B LOTTERY FY 2026 AND THE RECENT MODERNIZATION RULE 
  • Birthright Citizenship Under Fire: Trump’s Latest Executive Order Explained
  • BIA Holds That Its Prior Holding In Matter Of Fernandes, 28 I&N Dec. 605 (BIA 2022), That An Objection To A Noncompliant Notice To Appear Will Generally Be Considered Timely If Raised Prior To The Close Of Pleadings Is Not A Change In Law, And Thus Matter Of Fernandes Applies Retroactively.

Practice Areas

  • Business Immigration
  • Family Immigration
  • Marriage
  • PERM Labor Certification
  • Hearing & Appeals
  • Deportation, Removal, Asylum
  • I-9/Worksite Enforcement

LEAVE A REVIEW

Leave a Review on Google

        

San Francisco Office
930 Montgomery Street
Suite 502
San Francisco, CA 94133

Silicon Valley Office
5201 Great America Parkway
Suite 320
Santa Clara, CA 95054
Los Angeles Office
445 S. Figueroa Street
Suites 2600 & 2700
Los Angeles, CA 90071
©2025 Levin and Pangilinan PC. All Rights Reserved.
  • Business Immigration
  • Family Immigration
  • Labor Certification
  • I-9/Worksite Enforcement
  • Hearings & Appeals
  • Disclaimer
  • Privacy Policy

Copyright © 2025 · XML Sitemap · Sitemap

R-1
TN

The TN nonimmigrant classification allows qualified Canadian and Mexican citizens to enter the U.S. and engage in professional business activities. LPPC will help you navigate through the TN application process by evaluating your eligibility, preparing supporting documentation for your application, and ultimately filing your application. 

B-1

LPPC will guide you through the consular process to receive a B-1 visa for specific short-term business purposes ranging from contract negotiations to seminars and conferences.

O-1

O-1 visas are for persons of extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business or sports. 

J-1

Administered by the Department of State, the J-1 visa is for students, trainees, academics, researchers, professionals or experts participating in an approved Exchange Visitor program. LPPC will assist you and your sponsor with preparing the necessary paperwork and the consular process so you can begin your program at ease. 

E-1 & E-2

E-1 visas and E-2 visas are for nationals of countries with which the United States has a treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation (FCN) or bilateral investment treaty (BIT). If you are a nonimmigrant trader or investor seeking to conduct business operations or develop a new enterprise in the U.S., we will help you file for the appropriate visa. As a recognized expert in this area, Mr. Levin will provide experienced and dependable assistance with E-1 or E-2 visa applications. 

  • E-1: If you are a national of a country that conducts a significant volume of trade with the U.S. (or if you intend to develop trade between the U.S. and your home country) you might be eligible for entry under an E-1 visa. 
  • E-2: The E-2 visa allows investors from treaty countries to enter the U.S. for purposes of directing and developing a business, with all the commitments and risks implicit in entrepreneurial activity. 
L-1

The L-1 visa category is for executives, managers or professionals employed by foreign affiliates of U.S companies. The L-1 visa is divided into two classifications:

  • L-1A Intracompany Transferee Executive or Manager
  • L-1B Intracompany Transferee Specialized Knowledge
H-1B

Many companies in the United States find themselves increasingly dependent on the talent, experience and energy of foreign national workers in professional, technical or specialized occupational fields. These employees typically enter the U.S. on nonimmigrant H-1B visas for “specialty occupations.” 

With extensive experience in business immigration, you can count on LPPC to guide your company or Human Resources department in preparing and filing an H-1B visa petition.

Green Card

Family preservation and reunification is a priority for our firm. Our attorneys have advised and assisted families from all over the world with entry visas, adjustment of status, and other immigration problems. 

  • Immediate Relatives: If you are the spouse, child, or parent of a U.S. citizen, we can help you obtain a green card through an Immediate Relative petition. 
  • Family-Based Preference: If your relative is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident, we can assist you with your green card application through one of the family based preference categories.
Fiances

If you are a U.S. citizen and your fiancé/fiancée or spouse is overseas, our office will assist you to navigate the CIS requirements and regulations to have the case approved and then prepare you and your spouse for the interview at the U.S. Embassy. LPPC will also help you find the best ways to resolve any problems you encounter if a waiver is required in your case.

Marriage

Immigration through marriage is a common means of obtaining permanent residence in the U.S.  Since 1991, Philip Levin & Associates has helped hundreds of couples immigrate to the U.S. and build their lives together. 

  • I-130 Petition and Adjustment of Status: If you are married to a U.S. citizen, present in the U.S. and eligible to do so, our attorneys will assist you in preparing and filing the necessary I-130 petition and I-485 adjustment of status application in the U.S.
  • Immigrant Visa Consular Processing: If you are married to a U.S. citizen and reside abroad, we will assist you in preparing and filing the IV petition with an Embassy or Consulate-General in your native country. 
  • I-751, Remove Conditions on Residence: If you have been married less than two years at the time your green card was initially approved, our office will help you in the joint petition process to become a permanent resident.